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INTRODUCTION
Protection of the rights of individuals is a task that the courts
of this country take very seriously.' Whatever the source of
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1. The United States Supreme Court will not act as a super-legislature to over-
ride the legislature at will. See, e.g., Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,
626 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 884 (1978). The Court's function is not to interject
itself into areas where the legislature may properly act and has acted in a proper
manner. The Court has specifically noted that it will not interfere with legislative
1
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those rights, the courts jealously guard them against govern-
ment oppression. 2 Once a right has been determined to be
fundamental or it has been determined that the affected per-
son is a member of a certain class of people, the state carries a
heavy burden to have the law upheld.3 Most often the rights to
civil liberties and basic freedoms dealt with by the courts work
for the benefit of individuals struggling to maintain dignity and
avoid discrimination. 4 An individual's freedom to make certain
determinations on nonfundamental rights unless the legislature has acted with no
rational basis. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).
However, where a fundamental right is involved, or where the legislature dis-
criminates against a suspect class of persons, the court can and will step in. In the
landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the United
States Supreme Court struck down state sanctioned, official segregation of public
schools. The Court was willing to step in and correct an injustice that impacted on
persons because of those persons' racial status. In Brown the Court dealt with state
action that impacted on fundamental rights or discrimination against certain groups.
The Court required the justification for such laws to meet a heightened standard of
review.
2. There are numerous instances where the courts have expressed desire to
protect the rights of individuals from official oppression. A clear example is the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury. "Trial by jury in serious criminal cases has long
been regarded as an indispensable protection against . . . governmental oppres-
sion.... ." Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 330 (1980).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also expressed its desire to protect the citi-
zens of this state from official denial of fundamental rights. In the recent case of
State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 385-86 (Minn. 1988), the court ruled that a Minne-
sota statute allowing six member juries in misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor
cases violated article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution. The statute in ques-
tion in Hamm did not violate any federal constitutional protections. See Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (sixth amendment does not constitutionally require states
to have 12 memberjuries). However, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that
the protection was available to state citizens under the Minnesota Constitution re-
gardless of the federal interpretation. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 381-82. The Hamm
court noted that the purpose of a jury is to protect individuals from oppression. Id.
at 384. Most interestingly, the court expressed a commitment to safeguard the rights
of state citizens. Id. at 383. Another example of Minnesota courts working to protect
individuals under state law is Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988), where
the court dealt with the rights of persons committed to mental institutions. InJarvis,
the court stated that "the courts cannot abdicate all responsibility for protecting a
committed person's fundamental rights .. " Id. at 147 (emphasis in original).
3. The standard of review used when fundamental rights are concerned is tradi-
tionally known as "strict judicial scrutiny." See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973). In order to be
upheld under this standard, the state must show that the law is necessary to meet a
"legitimate, articulated state purpose." Id. at 17.
4. In Brown v. Board of Education the Court acknowledged the public policy in-
volved with education and the evils surrounding official segregation.
[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic public respon-
sibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cul-
[Vol. 15
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intimate and fundamental life decisions without government
interference is vital to the protection of individual autonomy.
Protection of individual rights not only benefits the individual
involved but also society as a whole.5
Cases dealing with first amendment rights demonstrate an
assumption by the courts that the freedoms guaranteed by that
amendment are beneficial both to the individual and to society
as a whole. 6 Without the freedom to speak, print and believe
as one chooses, all of society, in addition to the individual who
is subject to regulation, suffers. The right to privacy is another
area where the courts assume, quite correctly in most cases,
that protecting the individual's "right to be let alone"7 is a de-
tural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has un-
dertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
5. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987). In holding that a partic-
ular search and seizure violated the individual defendant's constitutional rights, the
Court noted that "the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in
order to protect the privacy of us all." Id. at 329.
6. In an early freedom of speech case, Justice Brandeis wrote:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government
the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty
both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of
happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that free-
dom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth....
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449, (1969). The necessity of a free and in-
dependent press has also been recognized as indispensable to an informed society,
for the betterment of all. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
7. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (privacy right extends to
public telephone booth). Development of constitutional protections for a right to
privacy is particularly insightful in the desire of courts to protect certain basic rights
and freedoms of individuals. The United States Supreme Court was able to find a
fundamental right to privacy even though there is no mention of "privacy" in the text
of the Constitution. The various protected aspects of the right to privacy originate in
the "penumbra" of rights founded under several specific constitutional provisions.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Under this theory, the penum-
bras surrounding the guarantees in the Bill of Rights emanate to create a "zone of
privacy." Id at 484. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959
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sirable end both for the individual and the society as a whole. 8
No area better demonstrates the court's view that protecting
the rights of the individual are beneficial than cases involving
the rights of the accused in a criminal suit.9 The prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures' 0 and the right
against self-incrimination" demonstrate the court's concern
with protecting an individual defendant's rights, as well as pro-
8. A common thread in the privacy cases is the notion that protection of these
fundamental rights enhances the individual's ability to protect individual autonomy
and dignity. "[T]he Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of
individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government." Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetrician & Gynecology, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (cita-
tions omitted). In addition, the Court definitely perceives that protection of the indi-
vidual's right to privacy has a beneficial effect on society as a whole. "That promise
extends to women as well as to men. . . . A woman's right to make that choice
[whether to end a pregnancy] freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view,
would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guaran-
tees equally to all." Id. at 773. See also Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
The decisions creating and defining a woman's right to an abortion under the
right to privacy have been among the Court's most controversial decisions. See, e.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113. The continuing controversy that has existed since Roe
v. Wade clearly indicates that there is no universal agreement as to the wisdom or
benefits of granting certain rights to individuals.
9. Taken together, the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments to the United States
Constitution are the basis for most of the rights of an accused in a criminal suit. U.S.
CONST. amends. IV, V, and VI.
10. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (19.61), the
Court imposed the exclusionary rule on the states, thereby rendering any evidence
seized illegally inadmissible against the defendant. See id. at 655. Part of the Court's
rationale for this rule was the importance of preserving a person's privacy from the
arbitrary intrusion of the police. Id. at 650. The Court stated:
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more
than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less
than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts,
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.
Id. at 660. The exclusionary rule also assures all members of society that their private
domain will not be subject to unreasonable intrusions by the government. Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
11. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966),
the Court summarized the history behind the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
at 458-59. The Court concluded that the rule is necessary to strike a proper balance
between the needs of society and the individual.
Thus we may view the historical development of the privilege as one which
groped for the proper scope of governmental power over the citizen. As a
'noble principle often transcends its origins,' the privilege has come right-
fully to be recognized in part as an individual's substantive right, a 'right to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark
of our democracy.' We have recently noted that the privilege against self-
incrimination-the essential mainstay of our adversary system-is founded
on a complex of values. All these policies point to one overriding thought:
the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a gov-
[Vol. 15
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tecting society from the excesses and abuses of an overzealous
government. Protecting the accused may allow those that are
perceived guilty to go free, but these protections help secure
the freedom and rights of all.' 2
Courts are occasionally confronted with cases in which the
individual claims a right that is arguably not in that individual's
best interest. The court is then forced to grapple with the di-
lemma of enforcing the purported right when the exercise of
that right could be harmful to the individual. The court must
determine the extent to which the individual should be allowed
to assert a right even in the face of potentially disastrous indi-
vidual consequences. Such a situation occurs when an individ-
ual chooses to waive an established constitutional right.'
3
In those instances, courts must resolve the conflict between
an individual's freedom of choice and the court's knowledge
that such exercise may harm the individual. While the court is
understandably concerned with the individual's best interests,
an individual's freedom of choice is nonetheless vital to the ex-
ercise of fundamental human autonomy.
An indigent criminal defendant, for example, is entitled to
the services of a court appointed attorney.' 4 The United States
Supreme Court, however, has held that an indigent criminal
defendant has the right to reject the services of appointed
counsel at trial, and may proceed pro se.' 5 While few would
agree that the exercise of such a right is wise, it is a guaranteed
right under the Constitution, and correlative to the right to
ernment-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens.
Id. at 460 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 579, 581-82 (Frank,J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)) (citations omitted).
12. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
13. On a certain level any time a criminal defendant chooses to waive a constitu-
tional right, there is the possibility that the defense will be harmed. Pleading guilty
to a criminal charge, for example, might be harmful if the state has a weak case.
However, so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary, the courts will allow a
defendant to waive these rights and plead guilty. See McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
However, in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26 (1965), the United States
Supreme Court declined to hold that a defendant has a constitutional right to a
bench trial in a criminal case. The right to a jury trial under the sixth amendment
was held to not give rise to a correlative constitutional right to reject a jury trial in
favor of a bench trial.
14. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
19891
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assistance of counsel.' 6 The dispute over whether there is a
right to self-representation has been settled at the trial level.
The issue remains whether the right to proceed pro se extends
to appeal.17 The cases are divided on whether such a right ex-
ists. "'8 In the recent case of State v. Seifert,' 9 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that under current state law an indigent
criminal defendant may proceed pro se on direct appeal. 20
While the Seifert court was careful to base its decision on
state statutes and rules, the decision nevertheless raises serious
constitutional issues. This article analyzes the issues surround-
ing the Seifert case, and concludes that constitutional principles
would not allow a court to hold that an indigent criminal de-
fendant must accept representation on direct appeal. 2' While
the dissenting justices in Seifert viewed the denial of self-repre-
sentation on direct appeal to be permissible, 22 a constitutional
issue that was not addressed by the court or the dissents would
prohibit such a result. The thesis of this article is that current
Minnesota state law and custom, as well as principles of equal
protection, require that the state allow an indigent criminal de-
fendant to proceed pro se on direct appeal. Furthermore, any
change that might negate the effect of Seifert is unlikely to with-
stand constitutional attack.
2 3
I. FARRETA AND THE RIGHT TO PROCEED PRO SE UNDER THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT
Prior to 1963, a state's failure to provide counsel to an indi-
gent defendant charged with a noncapital crime was not viola-
tive of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
24
16. Id. See infra notes 36-47, 111 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
18. Id.
19. 423 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1988).
20. See id. at 374.
21. See infra notes 124-82 and accompanying text.
22. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 374 (Wahl, J., dissenting), 379 (Simonett, J.,
dissenting).
23. See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
24. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 339 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a state's refusal to appoint coun-
sel for an indigent defendant did not in all cases violate due process. See id. at 471.
The Court instead viewed the concept of due process as flexible, and refused to
adopt a per se rule requiring counsel, stating:
Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality
of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial
[Vol. 15
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The United States Supreme Court had construed the sixth
amendment guarantee of the right to counsel25 to require the
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in federal
court. 26 The Court, however, refused to extend the same re-
quirement to state courts27 unless special circumstances
existed. 28
In 1963, less than twenty years after refusing to require a
state to offer counsel to indigent defendants, the Court over-
ruled itself in Gideon v; Wainwright.29 It concluded that the sixth
amendment guarantee of the right to counsel was indeed fun-
damental and essential to a fair trial, and therefore binding on
the states. 30 The Court recognized the inability of the average
of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in
other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of
such denial.
Id. at 462.
25. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
26. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
27. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 465. The Court, after finding that the sixth amendment
established "no rule for the conduct of the States," next considered whether the
requirement of counsel in the federal courts was "a rule so fundamental and essential
to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. After considering the history of the right to
counsel, the Court concluded that in state court the right to appointed counsel "is
not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." Id. at 471.
28. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court held that under the
particular circumstances of the infamous Scottsboro case, the refusal to appoint
counsel constituted a denial of due process. The factors considered to be significant,
in addition to the fact that it was a capital case, included "ignorance, feeble minded-
ness, illiteracy, or the like .. " Id. at 71.
Following the Betts decision, the Court required a strict showing by a defendant
of special circumstances in order to entitle him to counsel. See, e.g., Foster v. Illinois,
332 U.S. 134, 138 (1947) (refusal to appoint counsel before entry of guilty plea not
violative of due process). However, that attitude soon softened. See Bute v. Illinois,
333 U.S. 640, 676 (1948) (counsel required in all capital cases even absent special
circumstances). Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660, 666 (1950), was the last capital
case in which the court failed to find special circumstances requiring appointment of
counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
30. Id. at 341-42. It is interesting to note that the petition for certiorari in Gideon
was a pro se petition, handwritten in pencil by Clarence Earl Gideon from a prison in
Florida. See A. LEWIs, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1966) for a full story of Gideon's struggle.
Ironically, although counsel was eventually appointed, the case which guaranteed the
right to appointed counsel in state courts began as a pro se case by ajailhouse lawyer.
Id.
Betts was decided less than 20 years before Gideon. Considering the general con-
servatism of the law in general and the Court's reluctance to overrule its previous
1989]
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lay person to conduct an effective defense.3 l
Gideon and its progeny guaranteed that an indigent defend-
ant could not be convicted and imprisoned unless counsel was
indeed provided. 32  Soon, however, the question arose
whether a defendant, who was constitutionally entitled to ap-
pointed counsel, could nevertheless forego representation and
defend the action pro se.
3 3
A. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
Previously, the Court recognized that due process does not
prohibit a pro se defense. 34 The Court has implied that the sixth
amendment right to counsel inherently embodied a "correla-
tive right to dispense with a lawyer's help."3 5 In Faretta v. Cali-
construction of constitutional provisions, it is worth speculating whether an attorney,
trained in the law and well aware of the Court's hesitancy to overrule recent deci-
sions, would have insisted that an indigent defendant be entitled to appointed coun-
sel in all cases. That, however, is exactly what Clarence Earl Gideon did in his pro se
petition. His only claim was that a poor man, tried for a felony in state court, was
entitled to appointed counsel under the United States Constitution. This was a con-
tention expressly contrary to the Betts holding. If nothing else, this case shows that
pro se appeals can raise very significant issues.
31. The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrel-
evant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69, quoted in Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45.
32. While Gideon applies only to felony convictions, the rule was subsequently
extended to any criminal case wherein the defendant is in fact sentenced to imprison-
ment. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
33. See Note, The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MINN. L. REV.
1133 (1965) (concluding that defendant should be allowed to intelligently waive
counsel); see also Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se in Criminal Proceedings, WASH. U.L.Q
679 (1973).
34. Neither the historic conception of Due Process nor the vitality it derives
from progressive standards of justice denies a person the right to defend
himself or to confess guilt. Under appropriate circumstances the Constitu-
tion requires that counsel be tendered; it does not require that under all
circumstances counsel be forced upon a defendant.
Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174-75 (1946) (citation omitted).
35. Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942). Adams did
not hold that the Constitution forbade a state from requiring a defendant to accept
counsel. The question was whether a person could competently waive the right to a
[Vol. 15
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fornia,3 6 the Court was squarely presented with the extent of
the constitutional protection of the right to proceed pro se at
trial. The defendant requested permission to represent him-
self at trial because he believed that the public defender's of-
fice was overworked.3 7 After questioning the defendant, the
trial court granted his request. 38 The court later reversed its
ruling. 39 The defendant was subsequently convicted after be-
ing forced to accept representation at trial. 40 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, stating that the ques-
tion to be reviewed was "whether a State may constitutionally
hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer
upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his
own defense." 4 1 Although finding it a difficult question, the
majority concluded that the Constitution prohibits a state from
forcing unwanted representation on an accused. 42
The majority began its analysis by acknowledging the long-
standing statutory right to self-representation in the federal
jury trial without the advice of counsel. The Court concluded that "an accused, in
the exercise of a free and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the
court, may waive trial by jury, and so likewise may he competently and intelligently
waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel." Id. at 275.
Moreover, though Adams did not directly address the issue, the language of that
opinion strongly suggests that a state may not force counsel on a criminal defendant.
The Court explained:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense
with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations
that go to the substance of an accused's position before the law....
... What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be
turned into fetters.... To deny an accused a choice of procedure in circum-
stances in which he, though a layman, is as capable as any lawyer of making
an intelligent choice, is to impair the worth of great Constitutional safe-
guards by treating them as empty verbalisms.
... When the administration of the criminal law... is hedged about as
it is by the Constitutional safeguards for the protection of an accused, to
deny him in the exercise of his free choice the right to dispense with some of
these safeguards . . .is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the
Constitution.
Id. at 279-80, quoted in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 815 (1975) (citation
omitted).
36. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
37. Id. at 807. Notice that the Faretta Court never once questioned the accuracy
or reasonableness of this belief. Rather, the Court proceeded to decide the case
solely on the basis of the stated belief.
38. Id. at 808.
39. Id. at 810.
40. Id. at 811.
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courts.43 In addition, the Court noted that the right to self-
representation had been recognized by numerous states.
44
The Court also looked to the language of the amendment it-
self,4 5 and found that "the right to self-representation-to
make one's own defense personally-is thus necessarily im-
plied by the structure of the Amendment." 46
While acknowledging the critical importance of an attorney's
assistance in ensuring a defendant a fair trial, the Court also
recognized the clear principle implicit in the Bill of Rights af-
firming an individual's "inestimable worth of free choice."
47
43. Id. at 812. The Court noted that section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
provided that in the federal courts "'the parties may plead and manage their own
causes personally or by the assistance of. . . counsel. . . .' The right is currently
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654." Id. at 813. Most significantly, the Judiciary Act was
"enacted by the First Congress and signed by President Washington one day before
the Sixth Amendment was proposed .... Id. at 812-13. Thus, the drafters of the
sixth amendment must have been aware of the right to appear pro se.
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, interpreted these same circumstances and
reached the opposite conclusion. He stated:
The text of the Sixth Amendment, which expressly provides only for a right
to counsel, was proposed the day after the Judiciary Act was signed. It can
hardly be suggested that the Members of the Congress of 1789, then few in
number, were unfamiliar with the Amendment's carefully structured lan-
gnage, which had been under discussion since the 1787 Constitutional Con-
vention. And it would be most remarkable to suggest, had the right to
conduct one's own defense been considered so critical as to require consti-
tutional protection, that it would have been left to implication. Rather,
under traditional canons of construction, inclusion of the right in the Judici-
ary Act and its omission from the constitutional amendment drafted at the
same time by many of the same men, supports the conclusion that the omis-
sion was intentional.
Id. at 844 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Blackmun, dissent-
ing separately, found the historical evidence to be inconclusive. Id. at 850 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 813 & nn. 9-10. Moreover, the majority looked at the English common
law and found a long tradition of allowing persons to appear in court on their own
behalf. Id. at 821-26.
45. The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be
made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make
his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who must be 'informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation,' who must be 'confronted with the wit-
nesses against him,' and who must be accorded 'compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor.' Although not stated in the Amendment in so
many words, the right to self-representation-to make one's own defense
personally-is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment.
Id. at 819.
46. Id. Both dissents rejected the majority's conclusion that the right to self-
representation is implicit in the language of the amendment itself. "It is self-evident
that the Amendment makes no direct reference to self-representation. Indeed, the
Court concedes that the right to self-representation is 'not stated in the Amendment
in so many words.' " Id. at 847 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 833-34.
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In short, the defendant was given the opportunity to make an
informed choice as to the value of counsel.
B. The Extension of the Faretta Right to Appeal
After the Faretta Court determined that there exists a right
to proceed pro se at trial, the question naturally became
whether the same right exists in other stages of the criminal
prosecution. 48 A much litigated area in this regard is whether
a defendant may proceed pro se on appeal.
49
The courts that have reached this issue are split on whether
48. Prior to Faretta, several appellate courts addressed the concept of self-repre-
sentation on appeal. See Baker v. Arkansas, 505 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1974) (defendant
may represent self if he or she knowingly and intelligently refuses counsel on appeal,
and signs an affidavit that no help was received from another prisoner on the appel-
late brief); United States v. O'Clair, 451 F.2d 485, 486 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 986 (1972) (defendant may represent self if defendant feels qualified; otherwise
defendant must accept counsel); United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706, 707 (5th Cir.
1970) (right to appeal pro se); United States ex rel. Sliva v. Rundle, 295 F. Supp. 613,
616 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (asserting right to proceed pro se acts as waiver of counsel);
Mitchell v. State, 175 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 177 So. 2d
481 (Fla. 1965) (right to appeal pro se); Finley v. Thompson, 100 Ga. App. 508, 509,
112 S.E.2d 166, 167 (1959) (right to appeal pro se); Lee v. Kindelan, 80 R.I. 212,
220-21, 95 A.2d 51, 55 (1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 1000 (1953) (right to appeal pro
se); State v. Jones, 57 Wash. 2d 701, 703, 359 P.2d 311, 313 (1961) (right to appeal
pro se). But see People v. Ashley, 59 Cal. 2d 339, 361, 29 Cal. Rptr. 16, 29, 379 P.2d
496, 509 (1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 819 (1963) (no right to appeal pro se).
49. In one notable case, a defendant insisted on proceeding pro se at a pre-trial
hearing. See United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1983). The
court held, without extensive analysis of the procedural posture of the case, that "[a]
criminal defendant certainly has a right to refuse counsel and conduct his own de-
fense .. " Id. at 232 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
The real issue in George was whether a pro se defendant may also insist on access
to legal materials and research assistance. The court held that: "[Ilt is not the pre-
rogative of a defendant in custody to decide whether he will accept either the State's
offer of legal counsel or instead insist that the State provide him with access to 'the
same facilities that a bar association lawyer would get.' " Lane, 718 F.2d at 233 (citing
State v. Simon, 297 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 1980)). The practical implication of George is
that a defendant who rejects appointed counsel also is effectively cut off from legal
materials necessary to pursue his appeal.
This rule seems consistent with constitutional principles. See Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817 (1977). In Bounds, the Court held that the constitutional right of access
to the courts requires, in any proceeding where there is no right to the assistance of
counsel, a state to provide either "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law." Id. at 828. However, courts have interpreted Bounds to
mean that the right of access to the courts "is satisfied if, in lieu of a law library,
adequate assistance of counsel is provided." Johnson By Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d
1201, 1208 (7th Cir. 1983). Thus, it is apparently the state's prerogative to decide
what the defendant gets, and if the defendant rejects one offer, the defendant is not
entitled to the other. See also Bell v. Hopper, 511 F. Supp. 452, 453 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
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a defendant may reject counsel and proceed pro se on appeal.50
In addition, the various courts use different rationales for
reaching their results. 5' Thus, there is no uniform agreement
as to the analysis and resolution of this issue.
A few courts have expressly held that the rule in Faretta ap-
plies to appeals. 52 The theory is that the sixth amendment
right to the assistance of counsel is applicable to both the trial
and first appeal of a criminal case. The correlative right to re-
ject counsel should therefore be equally applicable. 53 The
thrust of these cases is that the courts perceive no meaningful
distinction between trial and appeal as it relates to the right to
reject counsel. 54 This theory has much intuitive appeal. The
50. Compare Chamberlain v. Ericksen, 744 F.2d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1008 (1985) (defendant not required to have appellate counsel thrust
upon him or her at trial or appeal); Bell, 511 F. Supp. at 453 (no right to law library
on pro se appeal); Owen v. State, 269 Ind. 513, 517, 381 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (1978)
(declines to ground right on federal constitution, rather, state law and policy dictate
granting right); People v. Stephens, 71 Mich. App. 33, 38, 246 N.W.2d 429, 432
(1976) (right found in state and federal constitution); State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d
368, 370 (Minn. 1988) (right found in state law); Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 783
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (Faretta expressly extended to appeal) with United States v.
Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 560 (4th Cir. 1985) (Faretta held not to apply to appeal);
Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239, 245-46 (7th Cir. 1984) (Faretta's sixth amendment
rationale does not extend to appeal); Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 677 (9th Cir.
1981) (allowing supplemental pro se brief satisfies any hypothetical right that may ex-
ist); In re Walker, 56 Cal. App. 3d 225, 227-28, 128 Cal. Rptr. 291, 292 (1976) (since
appeal is discretionary, it may be limited to deny self-representation); Callahan v.
State, 30 Md. App. 628, 635, 354 A.2d 191, 194-95 (1976) (hybrid representation on
appeal is discretionary and not mandated by Faretta).
51. As can be seen, the cases cited in supra note 50, show any number of ratio-
nales for the various conclusions reached. However, several courts have come to
diametrically opposed conclusions about the applicability of Faretta to this issue.
Compare Bell, 511 F. Supp. at 453 ("A criminal defendant [in a case on appeal] cer-
tainly has a right, correlative with his right to assistance of counsel, to dispense with
counsel, and conduct his defense in propria persona." (citing Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806 (1975)) with Gillis, 773 F.2d at 560 ("Although a convicted defendant has a
right to counsel on appeal, his implicit Sixth Amendment right to represent himself
at trial does not carry over to the appeal."). Thus, there is a split of authority on the
constitutionality of pro se appeals. Eventually, the United States Supreme Court will
have to settle this dispute.
52. See, e.g., Stephens, 71 Mich. App. at 38, 246 N.W.2d at 432; Webb, 533 S.W.2d
at 783. These cases rely more on the tenor and broad scope of Faretta rather than the
specific constitutional provisions upon which the Faretta court relied.
53. See, e.g., Webb, 533 S.W.2d at 783 ("We discern no meaningful distinction
between conducting a defense at trial and prosecuting an appeal which would pre-
vent the application of the Faretta rationale to the case of an appellant who wished to
reject representation by counsel and instead represent himself on appeal").
54. The right to reject counsel is constitutionally protected in these cases. Thus,
counsel cannot be forced upon an unwilling defendant. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835
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language and rationale of Faretta are quite broad, and would
seem to support the right to reject counsel at both the trial and
appellate levels. 55 If one focuses on the freedom of choice as-
pect of Faretta, the defendant should logically be allowed that
same freedom at the appellate stage of the proceedings. 56
The basic weakness with the cases acknowledging self-repre-
sentation on appeal is that the issue is never extensively ana-
lyzed. The courts seem to assume the independent existence
of the right under the Constitution, relying primarily on the
breadth of Faretta.57 However, the constitutional analysis of
Faretta is much narrower and may not be applicable to the ap-
pellate stage. In any event, these cases do not embark on an
analysis to determine if the same constitutional principles ap-
ply. It is significant that at least one other court prior to Seifert
declined to adopt the reasoning of Faretta, and held that the
(part of waiver is to make defendant aware of the disadvantages of self-representa-
tion); Chamberlain, 744 F.2d at 630 (citation omitted) ("We have no doubt that a de-
fendant is not required to have counsel forced upon him or her .... This rule is true
not only at trial but on appeal."); see also Stephens, 71 Mich. App. at 38, 246 N.W.2d at
432 ("Furthermore, there seems to be no meaningful distinction that can be drawn
between the right to represent oneself at the trial level and the fight to submit an
appellate brief."). The only real question that must be answered, therefore, is not
whether a waiver of counsel can be made, but rather whether the waiver was know-
ing, voluntary and intelligent.
55. The Faretta Court states: 'qBut it is one thing to hold that every defendant,
rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a
State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want." Faretta, 422 U.S.
at 833.
56. "The right to defend is personal.... And although he may conduct his own
defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' " Id. at 834 (quoting
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring), reh 'g denied,
398 U.S. 915 (1970)).
The dissent took issue with the majority's willingness to protect a defendant's
freedom of choice. The dissent criticized the majority for holding that any defendant
in any criminal proceeding may insist on representing himself regardless of how
complex the trial is likely to be and regardless of how frivolous the defendant's moti-
vations may be. "The Court seems to suggest that so long as the accused is willing to
pay the consequences of his folly, there is no reason for not allowing a defendant the
right to self-representation." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
57. The actual holding of Faretta was that self-representation at trial is embodied
as a correlative right to the assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. By
ruling that there is no distinction in the right as it applies to trial and as it applies to
appeal, the courts are assuming that trial and appeal stand on the same footing under
the sixth amendment. As shown in the cases that reject this proposition, trial and
appeal do not, in fact, stand on the same footing under the sixth amendment. See
infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
1989]
13
Krikava and Winking: The Right of an Indigent Criminal Defendant to Proceed Pro Se on
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL L.4 W REVIEW
right to self-representation on appeal exists under state law
and policy. 5
8
Insofar as it is the defendant who must ultimately bear the
consequences of any criminal proceeding,5 9 appeal is concep-
tually identical to trial. To the extent that these decisions rely
on the policy of allowing freedom of choice, 60 there is no dif-
ference in the two proceedings. Significant differences do ex-
ist, however, between trial and appeal. 6' One difference is a
defendant's relative need for counsel. 62 A more significant dif-
ference is that trial in a criminal case requires finding and adju-
dication of facts by the jury. Appeal, on the other hand, deals
more with the court's review of those facts and its considera-
tion of possible errors of law. Arguably, a defendant might be
58. See Owen v. State, 269 Ind. 513, 517, 381 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (1978). The
court stated: "[T]here is disagreement about whether the federal self-representation
right extends to appeals.... However this may be, self-representation has tradition-
ally been allowed in this state at both the trial level, . . . and at the appellate
level .... I d. (citations omitted).
59. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. As noted by the Faretta Court, the attorney acts as a
representative, assisting the client rather than as the master, dictating to the client.
The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel,
like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid
to a willing defendant-not an organ of the State interposed between an
unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally.... In such
a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master....
Id. at 820.
60. See id. at 834-35.
61. Most significantly, the purposes of trial and appeal are different. The trial
court is primarily responsible for finding and adjudicating facts. In a criminal case,
the jury must determine and apply the facts and make a finding of guilt or innocence.
It is the jury's exclusive function to assess witness credibility and weigh the conflict-
ing facts. See State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980); see also State v.
Ostlund, 416 N.W.2d 755, 760 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (trier of fact determines credi-
bility and weight of opinion testimony). The same rule applies in a civil case, where
the trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly errone-
ous. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
The appellate court, on the other hand, is primarily responsible for correcting
errors that occur at trial. See Seikow v. Setkow, 413 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (The appellate courts are bound by the various standards of review for examin-
ing the trial court record. In most cases, the appellate court may not try the matter
de novo.) An appellate court may intervene in a criminal case only if the record does
not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or if errors of law have
occurred. See State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Minn. 1978). The appellate
court also has responsibility to correct legal errors committed by the trial court. The
appellate court may not retry the facts of the case.
62. "The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him
against being haled into court by the State and stripped of his presumption of inno-
cence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt." Ross v. Mof-
fitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974).
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able to elicit and present the facts to a jury, but the legal ques-
tions raised on an appeal require a completely different set of
skills. Some of the cases that reject self-representation on ap-
peal rely on these differences to justify their result.
63
Also pertinent are the historical distinctions that exist be-
tween trial and appeal. As previously noted, the Faretta deci-
sion relies heavily upon the historical and preconstitutional
foundation of self-representation at trial. 64 The right of ap-
peal, in and of itself, is without such historical or constitutional
foundations. 65 In fact, there is no constitutional right of ap-
peal. 66 The right exists only as provided by state law. There-
fore, the courts are correct in dismissing this aspect of Faretta
when analyzing the applicability of pro se appeals.
The three leading cases holding that self-representation is
not constitutionally protected on appeal have found the histor-
ical distinctions between trial and appeal to be dispositive.
67 If
the state chooses to institute an appellate process, there is
clearly a sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel at
63. Apparently it is appropriate for a defendant to do battle at trial with no
shield, but it is not allowed for a defendant to go into an appellate battle without a
sword. It raises an interesting question of which is better, the sword or the shield. At
any rate, this analysis does not take into account whether a defendant should be al-
lowed freedom of choice to make such a decision.
64. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812-17. See supra notes 43-44.
65. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute right,
independently of constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such ap-
peal. A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case,
however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at com-
mon law and is not now a necessary element of due process of law. It is
wholly within the discretion of the state to allow or not allow such a re-
view .... It is, therefore, clear that the right of appeal may be accorded by
the State to the accused upon such terms as in its wisdom may be deemed
proper.
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894).
66. SeeJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983)(no constitutional right to ap-
peal); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (state not required by the
Federal Constitution to provide a right to appellate review). However, once the right
to appeal has been granted it must be applied equally so as not to deprive litigants
access to the appellate process on account of their poverty. Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
67. See United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 559-60 (4th Cir. 1985) (there exists
no constitutional right to appeal; however, once granted by statute, equal protection
and due process are applicable); see also Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239, 244-46 (7th
Cir. 1984) (the court notes that on appeal the defendant needs an attorney not as a
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trial and on first appeal.68 However, appeal does not have the
historical underpinnings of trial. Thus, it cannot be said that a
"correlative" right to self-representation under the sixth
amendment exists on appeal as it does at trial.69 The basic ra-
tionale of this rule is that, since appeal is a creature of state
law, the state may constitutionally regulate it and limit the way
litigants employ the process. 70 If a state requires appellate
counsel, the sixth amendment as interpreted in Faretta, does
not bar such representation. 7'
Consequently, the post Faretta cases are inconclusive con-
cerning the constitutional applicability of the right of self-rep-
resentation on appeal. Its ultimate resolution both in
Minnesota and elsewhere is left for another day. This split of
authority forced the Minnesota Supreme Court to confront the
issue directly. The court, however, dodged resolution of the
issue by basing its analysis on statutory construction.
II. STATE V. SEIFERT, 423 N.W.2D 368 (MINN. 1988), AND
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL PRO SE UNDER CURRENT
STATE LAW
A. Background
In State v. Seifert,72 the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced
with the issue of an indigent criminal defendant's right to self-
representation on appeal. Craig Thomas Seifert was convicted
68. See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357 (counsel must be made available on first appeal).
69. In Gillis, the court held that, since appeal is a creature of modem statute, the
implicit right of self-representation does not carry over to appeals. Gillis, 773 F.2d at
560.
70. "California has made the right to appeal a statutory creature whose scope
and authority is only as specifically delineated." In re Walker, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 227, 128
Cal. Rptr. at 292 (emphasis added). This is true so long as the specifically delineated
appellate authority does not discriminate against any classes of litigants based on
wealth. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
71. See, e.g., Gillis, 773 F.2d at 560. The Gillis court relied heavily on the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). In Price,
the Court noted that a defendant or "prisoner has no absolute right to argue his own
appeal or even to be present at the proceedings in an appellate court." Id. at 285
(quoting Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 449 (1892)). Extending the Price hold-
ing, the Gillis court opined that self-representation on appeal is not constitutionally
protected. However, the Price holding dealt only with the right to appear and argue
before the court. It did not deal with the writing of briefs or handling other aspects
of the appeal.
72. 423 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1988).
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of two separate felonies. 73 Seifert was determined to be indi-
gent and therefore eligible for representation by the State Pub-
lic Defender's Office (SPDO) on his appeal.7 4 Seifert, however,
wanted to dispense with that representation and proceed pro se
on both appeals. 7
5
Seifert's determination to represent himself stemmed from
his belief (apparently shared by other inmates) that the SPDO
furnished perfunctory representation to defendants. 76 More-
over, disputes between inmates and the SPDO are of long-
standing duration and have been litigated before.
77
Prior to the Seifert decision, the SPDO had attempted to ac-
commodate indigent defendants who wished to proceed pro se.
Although the appointed attorney retained control over the ac-
tual appeal, the defendant was allowed to file a supplemental
pro se brief, raising whatever issues the defendant desired.78
The supplemental brief, however, was prepared by the defend-
ant without access to the trial transcript, which was ordered
and retained by the SPDO.
79
73. Id. at 369.
74. Id. See MINN. STAT. § 611.14 (1986) (delineates the classes of persons that are
entitled to representation by the SPDO).
75. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 369.
76. See Zack, Prisoner entitled to represent self in an appeal, court rules, Star Tribune of
the Twin Cities, Apr. 29, 1988, at 12C, col.2. In the news report of Seifert's success
in this case, Seifert was quoted as saying: "Inmates feel they don't get any justice
because [the SPDO] is a prosecutor in public defender's clothes." Id. In another
article, a "disgruntled inmate" described the SPDO as the "public pretender." Sha-
piro, For the Defense, Twin Cities Reader, June 29, 1988, at 1.
One may certainly question the accuracy of this perception. In her dissent, Jus-
tice Wahl specifically noted that the briefs submitted by the SPDO have been "of the
highest quality." Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 377 (Wahl,J., dissenting). In fact, few could
reasonably challenge the ability, commitment and dedication of the SPDO.
Specifically, these authors do not necessarily agree with the contentions raised
against the SPDO. However, the accuracy of the perception concerning the quality of
representation is not relevant for present purposes. What is significant is that the
defendant believes, for whatever reason, that self-representation is preferable to that
of the SPDO. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Ericksen, 744 F.2d 628, 629 (8th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1008 (1985) (Chamberlain's supplementary brief raised the issue
concerning his dissatisfaction with the public defender).
78. See Case v. State of Minnesota, 364 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1985). In Case,
the court recognized that an indigent appellant may supplement the efforts of the
court appointed attorney by filing a supplemental pro se brief. Id. It did not, however,
address whether the indigent appellant may dispense with counsel altogether. See
also Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 377 (Wahl, J., dissenting) (good discussion of the appeal
procedures used by the SPDO including the use of supplemental pro se briefs).
79. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 369 n. 1.
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Seifert was not satisfied with the existing policy. He consist-
ently maintained that the SPDO was not authorized to act on
his behalf. After both convictions, he notified the SPDO that
he wished to represent himself on appeal.80 He also attempted
to acquire a copy of his transcripts to help in the preparation of
his appeals.81 The SPDO continued to act on his behalf, but
refused to give him access to the transcripts.
82
Seifert was undeterred. After his second conviction, he filed
a pro se motion to enjoin the SPDO from acting on his behalf,
and to supply him with a copy of his court transcripts at state
expense. 3 The Minnesota Court of Appeals denied the mo-
tion; the Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently granted Sei-
fert's pro se petition for accelerated review of the issue.8 4 In its
order granting review, the court stated the question as: "when
... may an indigent criminal defendant refuse representation
by the state public defender, act as his own attorney, and have
access at public expense to a copy of any transcript needed to
represent himselfl?]"' ' 5 After the court granted the petition,
counsel was appointed solely for the purpose of arguing the
issues on appeal.
8 6
80. See Petitioner's Brief And Appendix at Appendix A, State v. Seifert, 423
N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1988) (No. CI-87-452) [hereinafter Petitioner Brief]; Brief Of
State Public Defender As Amicus On Issue Of Pro Se Right To Appeal at Appendix
D, State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1988) (No. C 1-87-452) [hereinafter SPDO
Brief].
81. See SPDO Brief, supra note 80, at Appendix B and C.
82. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 369.
83. See SPDO Brief, supra note 80, at Appendix H.
84. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 369.
85. See SPDO Brief, supra note 80, at Appendix K. Because the issue presented
was so limited, the court left open the question of whether a nonindigent criminal
defendant had the right to proceed pro se on appeal. Indeed, both the Minnesota
Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court have accepted pro se appeals. See
infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. A rule that provides inconsistent treat-
ment between indigent and nonindigent appellants raises serious constitutional
questions. See infra notes 160--82 and accompanying text.
86. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 369. Thus, ironically, Seifert's argument that he had a
right to represent himself on appeal, was briefed and argued by counsel. Although
the State of Minnesota did not participate, three amicus briefs were submitted. The
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union submitted a brief in support of Seifert's position.
Both the Minnesota County Attorneys Association and the SPDO submitted amicus
briefs in opposition to Seifert's position. This strange alliance of prosecutors and
public defenders serves to underscore the unusual nature of this dispute. Unfortu-
nately, it also tends to reinforce the inmates' beliefs regarding the loyalty of the
SPDO. See Shapiro, supra note 76, at 10.
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The Seifert court stated that the basic issue in the case was
"whether an indigent criminal defendant may waive counsel on
direct appeal and proceed pro se." 87 Directly dependent upon
the resolution of that issue, was the second question of
whether such a defendant is entitled to access to the trial tran-
script to help prepare an appellate brief.88
The majority of the court held that an indigent defendant
has the power, under Minnesota statutes89 and rules,90 to
waive representation and proceed pro se on direct appeal. 9 1
The majority, in a proper exercise of judicial restraint, utilized
principles of statutory construction. It specifically grounded
it's decision on state law, thereby obviating the necessity of
reaching the constitutional issues raised by Seifert and amicus
curiae.
92
The majority's decision hinged upon its construction of Min-
nesota Statute section 611.2593 and Rule 28.02(5) of the Min-
nesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 94 that govern the SPDO's
87. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 369.
88. Id.
89. See MINN. STAT. § 611.25 (Supp. 1987).
90. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02(5).
91. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 371.
92. Id. at 369. In addition to making a statutory argument, Seifert and the Min-
nesota Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, contended that the system used by the
SPDO violated the equal protection and due process guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Seifert primarily argued that the rule
of Faretta applied to appeal. See Petitioner Brief, supra note 80, at 15-17. See also supra
notes 48-60 and accompanying text. The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union argued
that the present system treats indigent defendants differently due to their poverty in
violation of equal protection. Brief Of Minnesota Civil Liberties Union As Amicus at
3-10, State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1988) (No. CI-87-452) [hereinafter
Liberties Brief]; see infra notes 124-82 and accompanying text.
The SPDO and the Minnesota County Attorneys Association argued that indi-
gent criminal defendants have no Faretta right to proceed iro se on appeal, and that
Rule 28.02(5) mandates representation for indigent appellants. Consequently, since
no sixth amendment right to proceed pro se exists, it is not constitutionally required
that the defendant be personally granted access to the trial transcript. The fact that
counsel has the transcript is sufficient. See SPDO Brief, supra note 80; Brief Of Ami-
cus Curiae: Minnesota County Attorneys Association, State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d
368 (Minn. 1988) (No. CI-87-452) [hereinafter County Brief]. While the majority of
the court did not address these arguments, Justices Wahl and Simonett, in separate
dissents, agreed that self-representation is not guaranteed under Faretta.
93. MINN. STAT. § 611.25 (Supp. 1987).
94. MINN. RULE CRIM. P. 28.02(5).
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representation of defendants on appeal.9 5 The statute pro-
vides that the SPDO shall represent defendants on appeal
when directed to do so by the court.9 6 Rule 28.02(5), in con-
junction with the statute, delineates the procedures to be used
by indigent defendants who desire an appeal.97 In addition to
the foregoing, which specifically applies to appeals by indigent
defendants, the court considered the legislative policy allowing
a party to appear before any court on his or her own behalf.
98
The court construed the statute and the rule to require the
SPDO to represent indigent appellants if so required.99 The
majority rejected the contention that all indigent appellants
must accept its representation. 100 Central to the court's con-
clusion was the language in Rule 28.02(5), stating that "[a] in-
digent defendant wishing the services of an attorney" should make
application with the SPDO. t0 t The court correctly pointed out
that, "[i]f an indigent defendant must be represented by the
SPDO, as argued, then this is certainly an odd choice of
95. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 370-74.
96. The state public defender shall represent, without charge, a defendant
or other person appealing from a conviction or pursuing a post conviction
proceeding after the time for appeal has expired when the state public de-
fender is directed to do so by a judge of the district court, of the court of
appeals or of the supreme court.
MINN. STAT. § 611.25, subd. 1 (Supp. 1987), quoted in Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 369 (the
court used the 1986 version of § 611.25 which contained the same provision as stated
above).
97. (1) An indigent defendant wishing the service of an attorney in an ap-
peal or postconviction case shall make application therefore to the office of
the Public Defender,
(5) The State Public Defender's office shall determine if the applicant is
financially and otherwise eligible for representation. If the applicant is so
eligible then the State Public Defender shall represent him regarding a judi-
cial review or an evaluation of the merits of a judicial review of his case in a
felony case....
(6) All requests for transcripts necessary for judicial review or efforts to
have cases reviewed in which the defendant is not represented by an attor-
ney shall be referred by the court receiving the same to the office of the
State Public Defender for processing as in paragraphs (2) through (5) above.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02(5), quoted in Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 369-70.
98. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 370. See also infra note 156.
99. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 370.
100. "It does not, however, require that such a defendant must accept representa-
tion if he wishes to go it alone." Id.
101. Id. (emphasis in original). The court noted that MINN. STAT. § 611.14 "bol-
sters our belief that pro se appeals are statutorily authorized. This statute enumerates
what classes of persons are 'entitled to be represented by a public defender.' It does
not say these persons must accept such representation, only that they are entitled to
it." Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 611.14).
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The court did recognize that the predecessor to Rule
28.02(5), had expressly authorized pro se appeals. This express
authorization was deleted in 1983 when the rules underwent
significant amendment.103 However, the meaning of Minne-
sota Statute section 611.25 remained unchanged. 0 4 The court
was not persuaded that this decision changed the rule's im-
plicit recognition of pro se appeals.10 5
When the language of the statutes and rules is scrutinized, it
is clear that the court reached the correct result. The SPDO's
major argument-that the statutory mandate that it "shall rep-
resent" an indigent appellant forbids self-representation-ig-
nores the obvious purpose of the statute.'0 6 Minnesota
Statutes section 611.25 merely implements the constitutional
mandate that, where appeal is provided, equal protection re-
quires that appointed counsel be made available to indigent
appellants through first appeal.l0 7 Therefore, this statute does
not prohibit self-representation when an appellant properly
waives appointed counsel.10 8
After determining that state law grants a right to proceed pro
se on appeal, the court concluded that transcripts must be pro-
102. Id. at 370-71. If the drafters of the rule wished to require representation on
appeal it could have done so unambiguously by, for example, requiring any indigent
defendant wishing to appeal to apply to and cooperate with the SPDO.
103. Id. at 370 n.2. The former rule, stated:
All requests for transcripts or efforts to have cases reviewed in which the
defendant is not represented by an attorney shall be referred by the court
receiving the same to the office of the State Public Defender for processing.
Any applicant who then wishes to proceed without an attorney representing
him shall advise the court and the State Public Defender's office in writing
that he waives any right he may have to the services of the State Public De-
fender's office.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.02(7) (revised and rearranged in 1983 as MINN. R. CRIM. P.
28.02(5)).
104. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 370 n.2. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 611.25 (Supp. 1987).
105. "We do not believe this deletion changes the result, as Section 611.25 and
the other operative sections in the rule have not been changed to eliminate the right
to appeal pro se." Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 370 n.2.
106. Id. at 371.
107. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963); see also infra notes 146-47
and accompanying text.
108. MINN. STAT. § 611.19 (1986) governs waiver of appointed counsel. This sec-
tion was not mentioned by the Seifert court. However, it merely directs that any de-
fendant who waives counsel must make the waiver in writing. The statute does not
specifically apply only to trial counsel. Because waiver of counsel is expressly antici-
pated by statute, it would appear to support the majority's conclusions that state law
countenances pro se appeals.
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vided to the indigent defendant at no cost. 109 The remainder
of the opinion establishes temporary procedures to be fol-
lowed by the SPDO in implementing the decision and assuring
that the defendant makes a knowing, voluntary and intelligent
waiver of the right to appellate counsel."l 0 In an understate-
ment the court concluded by warning pro se appellants that "a
criminal defendant who elects to appeal pro se will very likely
harm rather than help his chances for success." ' I
C. Dissents
Two justices dissented in Seifert. 12 Justice Wahl interpreted
the relevant statutes and rules as requiring indigent defend-
ants to accept representation on appeal. This dissent focused
primarily on the "shall represent" language enunciated in the
statute and rules,' ' and concluded that this language unam-
109. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 371 (citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189
(1971)). The court noted that the pro se appellant was entitled to use of the trial tran-
scripts to prepare the appeal. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 371.
110. Id. at 371-74. The court enunciated guidelines for providing transcripts to
indigent pro se appellants and also cautioned that the transcript be safeguarded by the
appellant. Id. at 371-72. "Upon completion of the pro se brief, the transcript must be
returned to the SPDO and that office will provide the defendant with a signed re-
ceipt. That receipt must be provided to the Office of the Appellate Courts as a pre-
requisite to acceptance of the defendant's brief." Id. at 372 (footnote omitted). The
court did note that it would entertain motions to accept briefs if the transcript has
been inadvertently lost or destroyed. Id. at 372 n. 5. The court concluded with a
discussion of the practical limits placed on the pro se appellant and the necessity of
obtaining a written waiver of counsel. Id. at 372-74.
111. Id. at 374. In fact, the opinion itself places considerable restraints on the pro
se appellant's chances of success. First, there is the risk of a brief being rejected if the
transcript is not returned to the SPDO. Id. at 372. See supra note 110. Second, the
pro se appellant will not be given access to a law library. "The defendant may not
have it both ways. He must either accept appointed appellate counsel or proceed pro
se at his own risk, which, we might add, is considerable. If he makes that choice, the
defendant must proceed with whatever limited resources are on hand." Seifert, 423
N.W.2d at 373. Moreover, the majority noted that the pro se appellant "must still
comply with all procedural rules." Id. at 372.
The net effect of this discussion by the court is that the pro se appellant must
proceed within the procedural constraints applicable to attorneys without the neces-
sary knowledge or materials to adequately present the case. In light of this, it is
indeed the unwise indigent defendant who would make that choice. However, as the
majority pointed out, competency to waive appellate counsel and the wisdom of that
waiver are two entirely separate considerations. Id. at 374 n.7. The upshot of this is
that the competent defendant may waive appellate counsel, but must then live with
the consequences. Id.
112. Id. at 374 (Wahl, J., dissenting); Id. at 378 (Simonett, J., dissenting).
113. See MINN. STAT. § 611.25 (Supp. 1987); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02(5).
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biguously requires that result. 1 4 Justice Wahl then proceeded
to argue that Faretta and its progeny do not bar her reading of
the state law."15 Finally, Justice Wahl considered whether pro se
indigent appeals should be allowed as a matter of policy, and
concluded that they should not."1
6
The most troubling aspect of this dissent is that it ignores
two very significant concerns. First, rejecting Faretta as a con-
stitutional challenge does not address a separate and even
more serious constitutional issue." t 7 Second, this interpreta-
tion of state law focuses solely on the requirement that the
SPDO furnish representation to indigent defendants." 8 It ig-
nores the language that indicates that a defendant should have
the freedom to choose."
l 9
Similarly, Justice Simonett's dissent fails to address either of
114. "This language clearly and unambiguously requires the State Public De-
fender to represent indigent persons seeking review of their criminal convictions."
Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 374-75.
115. Yet nothing in Faretta indicates that the right to proceed pro se at trial
extends to a right to proceed pro se on appeal. Not only does the absence of
language indicating such a right exists imply that it does not exist, but this
conclusion can be otherwise inferred from the opinion and interpretations
thereof.
d. at 375.
116. Id. at 376-78. Justice Wahl recognized and expressed concern over the likely
reality ofpro se appeals. It is obvious that this was a chief concern of the dissent. For
example, incomprehensible briefs cause appellate courts and their clerks to perform
the proper duties of an appellate attorney. Id. at 378. Justice Wahl viewed these
potential and very real problems as mitigating strongly against any change in the
system. Id. But see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (Court emphasizes
freedom of choice as important consideration). See also infra note 178.
117. It is quite possible that the sixth amendment right to self-representation as
delineated in Faretta, does not extend to appeal. See supra notes 48-71 and accompa-
nying text. However, the dissent ignores the fact that a separate and distinct consti-
tutional issue existed and was raised. See Liberties Brief, supra note 92, at 3-10. The
state law, if interpreted as Justice Wahl argues, would prohibit indigent defendants
from proceeding pro se. Yet, nonindigents would not be so prohibited. Nothing in
the rules or statutes would prohibit a defendant who financially could hire an attorney
from declining to do so. Only those appellants who could not ifford counsel would be
deprived of the right to choose. And yet, the same concerns expressed in the dissent
would be equally applicable to nonindigent and indigent appellants. For a complete
discussion of this issue, see infra notes 124-82 and accompanying text.
118. What is absolutely clear is that Minnesota Statutes section 611.25 removes
any discretion from the SPDO in deciding whether or not to represent an indigent
defendant who wishes representation on appeal. See MINN. STAT. § 611.25 (Supp.
1987).
119. The majority recognized that this is a different issue. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at
370. The question is whether the legislative mandate to represent also removes all
freedom of choice from the defendant, the person who, as the majority pointed out,
"must live with the consequences" of that choice. Id. at 374.
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these concerns. While he agreed with the majority that state
law does not require an indigent defendant to accept appellate
representation,120 he concluded that the court has the power
to interpret its rules to prohibit pro se appeals.121 Justice
Simonett agreed with Justice Wahl that there is no constitu-
tional bar to prohibiting pro se appeals. 122 This dissent also fo-
cused on the potential problems with pro se appeals.' 23
As both the majority and dissents recognized, the choice to
proceed pro se is, in almost all cases, unwise and ineffective.
The question presented, then, is not whether the defendant is
making a wise choice, but rather, whether the defendant is en-
titled to make that choice and live with the consequences.
While the dissenters saw no constitutional infirmity under
Faretta to deprive an indigent appellant of the right to choose,
a far more troubling, and as yet unaddressed issue, casts doubt
on whether the Constitution would allow the system suggested
by the dissenters.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RIGHT TO PROCEED PRO SE
ON APPEAL UNDER MINNESOTA LAW
The Minnesota Supreme Court majority in Seifert did not
foreclose the possibility of changing the result by indicating
that the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Criminal Procedure could propose amendments to Rule
28.02(5).124 If change is desired, specifically negating pro se
120. Id. at 378 (Simonett, J., dissenting).
121. Id. Apparently under this interpretation, the appellant must either accept
unwanted representation or forfeit appeal altogether.
122. Id.
123. "To allow a rudderless appeal accompanied by an unwieldy procedural su-
perstructure is unfair to the defendant and unfair to the appellate court." Id. at
378-79. However, such concerns cannot be said to be controlling. The United
States Supreme Court has stated:
[Tihe Constitution recognizes higher value than speed and efficiency. In-
deed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Pro-
cess Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern of efficiency
and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less,
and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (footnote omitted).
124. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 371 n.3. By holding that the decision was governed by
statutory and rule interpretation, the result could be changed by redrafting any appli-
cable statutes or rules. The court pointed this out in its opinion.
It must also be noted that the present Rules of Criminal Procedure provide
the basis for our opinion here. If the [Supreme Court Advisory] Committee
[on Rules of Criminal Procedure] determines that the conclusions we have
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representation for indigent defendants would be the easiest
route.12 5 Such a change would undoubtedly bring a constitu-
tional challenge. 
26
While a challenge based on Faretta may not be successful, 27
an amended rule that does no more than negate the effect of
Seifert raises a far more fundamental constitutional chal-
lenge.' 28 Such a rule would raise an equal protection chal-
reached in interpreting the existing Rules is not in accord with the intention
of the Committee in its original and amendatory drafting of the rules, it may
recommend redrafted rules to more clearly express its intention.
Id. The only impediment to changing the rules would be if a particular rule change
would result in an unconstitutional denial of some protected right. But see id. at 374
(Wahl, J., dissenting) (arguing that present rules should be interpreted to prohibit pro
se appeals and that such an interpretation is constitutional).
125. Prior to 1983, pro se appeals were expressly authorized under Rule 29.02(7)
of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Paragraph 6 read:
All requests for transcripts or efforts to have cases reviewed in which
the defendant is not represented by an attorney shall be referred by the
court receiving the same to the office of the State Public Defender for
processing. Any applicant who then wishes to proceed without an attorney
representing him shall advise the court and the State Public Defender's of-
fice in writing that he waives any right he may have to the services of the
Public Defender's office.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.02(7), quoted in Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 370 n.2.
In 1983 the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended. Rule
29.02(7) was rearranged at 28.02(5). The present rule is essentially the same except
that the last sentence of paragraph six above was deleted.
The court in Seifert rejected any argument that deletion of this language
amounted to taking away the previously granted right. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 370 n.2.
Thus, in order to reverse the decision of Seifert, the Committee would have to draft
specific language prohibiting pro se appeals where the appellant is eligible for repre-
sentation by the SPDO. However, such a change would be unwise and would raise
grave constitutional questions. See infra notes 126-82 and accompanying text.
126. Despite the Seifert dissents' protests to the contrary, a Faretta challenge to
denial of the right might be successful. See, e.g., People v. Stephens, 71 Mich. App.
33, 38, 246 N.W.2d 429, 432 (1976) (applies Faretta analysis to appeal and perceives
no meaningful distinction). But see In re Walker, 56 Cal. App. 3d 227, 228, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 291, 292 (1976) (right to pro se appeal does not exist). In any event, the chal-
lenge could be brought. While Justices Wahl and Simonett rejected applying Faretta
to appeal, it is not at all clear how the other members of the court would decide the
issue.
127. See supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
128. The question raised, in light of Minnesota's current law and custom, con-
cerns the denial of a fundamental right to a certain, suspect class. This is not a ques-
tion that was answered by the Seifert majority. "We agree with Seifert that the current
statute and rule authorizes him to proceed pro se on direct appeal and have access to
the trial transcripts. Consequently, we need not reach the constitutional questions
raised." Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 369. Nor did the dissenting justices raise or analyze
this question. Those opinions do no more than reject the applicability of Faretta to
this case. "[Niothing in Faretta indicates that the right to proceed pro se at trial ex-
tends to a right to proceed pro se on appeal." Id. at 375 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
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lenge because of the denial of access to the judicial process
based solely on the classification of wealth.' 29 The United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it violates equal
protection to deny a fundamental right because of an individ-
ual's poverty.' 30 Without a massive restructuring of current
state law and custom, denial of the right of self-representation
on direct appeal would unconstitutionally deny indigent crimi-
nal defendants access to the courts because of their poverty.
Subtle distinctions must be made to distinguish this analysis
from that employed in Faretta.13 1 The cases holding that
Faretta does not apply to the appellate context have basically
held that the sixth amendment, as incorporated by the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, does not con-
template such a rule.' 3 2 Consequently, there is arguably no
129. This issue was raised in Seifert by the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union. See
Liberties Brief, supra note 92, at 3-10. The Seifert majority did not need to address
this issue. The dissenters, who sought to deny self-representation on appeal, inexpli-
cably failed to address the viability of this issue either. The dissenters apparently felt
it was sufficient to distinguish Faretta even though the present issue is different and
requires analysis of different considerations.
130. Wealth in and of itself is not a suspect classification. See generally J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.25, at 680 (3d ed. 1986). Where a
legislative classification based on wealth affects only economic or other nonfunda-
mental rights, it will be upheld if it meets the traditional rational basis test. See, e.g.,
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); reh 'g denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970); see
also San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972), reh'g denied,
411 U.S. 959 (1973) (the Court will not use an elevated standard of review in review-
ing a law that burdens poor people in allocation of nonfundamental benefits). This
rule was recently reaffirmed in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481,
2489 (1988). "We have previously rejected the suggestion that statutes having differ-
ent effects on the wealthy and the poor should on that account alone be subjected to
strict Equal Protection scrutiny." Id. As that case shows, often the salient constitu-
tional issue is whether the claimed right is, in fact, fundamental. See id. at 2492 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
However, once it is clear that a fundamental right is involved, classifications
based on wealth must be viewed through a higher standard. See, e.g., Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (marriage and family relationships are fundamen-
tal rights, and therefore, law charging filing fee for divorce must be waived for
indigent persons because there is no compelling reason to deny indigents divorce as
compared to nonindigents).
131. Any Faretta based analysis must ultimately be based on an interpretation of
the sixth amendment. Conversely, this issue is grounded on notions of the right of
persons to be treated equally in regards to fundamental rights. When a state at-
tempts to restrict a person's access to fundamental rights based on that person's pov-
erty, equal protection is violated. The state must demonstrate some compelling
reason for the distinction. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
132. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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constitutional violation in denying any appellant the right to
proceed pro se in the appellate process.133 However, these
cases were decided in a vacuum without reference to whether
any disparate treatment was given different classes of
litigants. 134
Whatever the implications for other states, Minnesota's stat-
utory and rules scheme countenance the ability of litigants
generally to proceed pro se on appeal. 3 5 A rule that merely
denies an indigent criminal defendant the right to proceed pro
se on direct appeal, while not changing other litigants' abilities
to do so, would create disparate treatment of two classes based
on the relative wealth of the litigants.
36
Poverty, as such, is not a suspect classification under the
equal protection analysis. '37 A classification that merely affects
an economic right will be upheld if it meets the traditional ra-
133. Id.
134. None of the cases holding that an indigent criminal defendant has a right to
appeal pro se address whether other classes of litigants are restricted in their right to
proceed without counsel. However, even one of the courts that rejected the Faretta
analysis in the appellate context noted that "[o]nce appellate review is established it
must be kept free from any procedures which violate due process or equal protection of the law." In
re Walker, 56 Cal. App. 3d 227, 227, 128 Cal. Rptr. 291, 292 (1976) (emphasis added).
Thus, even without Faretta, if the state appellate scheme employs procedures that
arbitrarily limit the access of poor appellants, equal protection is offended.
135. The Minnesota legislature has expressed its intent that nonattorneys may not
act in a representative capacity to other people. However, the statute expressly al-
lows a party to appear on that party's own behalf. MINN. STAT. § 481.02, subd. 1
(1986).
Thus, the general rule in Minnesota is that persons may appear without counsel
in any proceeding. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982). "In all courts of the United
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as,
by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein." Id. One federal court held, in a habeas petition case, that 28 U.S.C. § 1654
prohibits the courts from forcing counsel onto an unwilling defendant. See Lee v.
Alabama, 406 F.2d 466, 466 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969), reh'g
denied, 396 U.S. 871 (1969). However, another court found that this statute is subject
to the "rules of such courts." Based on a local rule, the court held the statute inap-
plicable and required appellate counsel. See United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 560
(4th Cir. 1985).
136. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
137. The basic rule under the Constitution is that all persons are accorded equal
rights, whether rich or poor. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), reh'g denied,
405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also 16A AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 739 (1979) ("The
Constitution of the United States is no respecter of the financial status of persons,
and rich and poor are to be accorded equal rights under it"); accord Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1980) (the general proposition is that the poor are not ac-
corded extra benefits simply because of their poverty).
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tional basis test.13 8 Similarly, a classification that only affects a
nonfundamental right will be upheld if it meets the same
test.13
9
However, when the classification involves disparate treat-
ment which affects a fundamental right, 40 a higher standard is
employed. t4 t In Gideon v. Wainwright,'42 the United States
Supreme Court held that access to the judicial process is a fun-
damental right.143 While no one landmark case has expressed
the precise standard of review in cases dealing with access to
the courts or other fundamental rights, the cases show that
classifications that burden the poor are to be reviewed as sus-
pect under the strict scrutiny test.
144
138. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970); see also San Antonio
Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (elevated standard not used in reviewing
law that burdens the poor in allocation of nonfundamental benefits).
139. In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2483 (1988), the
United States Supreme Court held that a state imposed fee for school bus transporta-
tion did not violate equal protection when applied to the poor. Since education is
not recognized as a fundamental right, the law was analyzed under the rational basis
test. The Court reiterated the test to be applied to these cases. "Unless a statute
provokes 'strict judicial scrutiny' because it interferes with a 'fundamental right' or
discriminates against a 'suspect class,' it will ordinarily survive an equal protection
attack so long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose." Id. at 2487. The dissent, however, argued that education is a
fundamental right, thus triggering a heightened standard of review. Id. at 2493 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
140. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie, the Court
held that a marital relationship is a fundamental right. It further found that a filing
fee in a divorce action impacted on that right. Therefore, the fee had to be waived
for poor people; otherwise, the fee denied the exercise of a fundamental right on the
basis of poverty.
In another case, however, the Court held that bankruptcy is not a fundamental
right. Therefore, bankruptcy court filing fees do not have to be waived for poor
people as the fees have a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.
See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
141. The heightened standard of review is generally termed "strict scrutiny."
However, Justice Marshall argues that labels should not be used and that the level of
scrutiny should vary depending on the "real interests at stake." Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct.
at 2492 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
143. The Court stated that counsel at trial is a fundamental right under the sixth
amendment. "[The assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth
Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and lib-
erty .... The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitu-
tional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' " Id. at 343,
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)).
144. SeeJ. NOWAK, supra note 130, § 14.25, at 680. The authors sum up the thrust
of the cases in this area.
In a series of decisions in the 1960's concerning rights to fair treatment in
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Although an appellate process is not required,14 5 once a
state implements one, its availability to all is deemed funda-
mental. Discriminating against defendants based upon
wealth 146 would impinge on the defendant's fundamental right
to equal access to the courts. 147 Therefore, counsel must be
equally available to an indigent appellant on a first appeal.1
48
In other words, once the state provides for appeal, its availabil-
ity to all persons without regard to wealth is deemed
fundamental.
In Ross v. Moffitt, 1 49 the United States Supreme Court ex-
plored the limits of equal access by indigents to the appellate
process. The Court held that the equal protection clause does
not require a state to offer an attorney to an indigent defend-
ant for discretionary appeals. 50 The Court stated that a de-
fendant is assured of an adequate opportunity to present
claims when the right to counsel is provided on first appeal.' 5 '
The Ross Court, however, noted the vitality of its prior deci-
the criminal process, voting rights, and ability to engage in interstate travel,
opinions of the Supreme Court had indicated that classifications which bur-
den the poor were to be reviewed under an increased standard of review as
suspect classifications.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also infra notes 146-53.
145. See supra note 65.
146. In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), reh'g denied, 373 U.S. 905
(1963), the Court held that when appeal as of right is offered by a state, an indigent
defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel to assist in the appeal. Id. at 356.
Basically, the Court ruled that access to the previously granted state right of appeal is
fundamental and must be granted to all regardless of wealth. Id. at 356-57. "For
there can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the
amount of money he has.'" Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19
(1956), reh'g denied, 351 U.S. 958 (1956)).
147. "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17. Moreover, after
noting that a state need not have an appellate process the Court stated: "But that is
not to say that a State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that dis-
criminates against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty." Id. at 18.
148. The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted Griffin to mean "that a poor per-
son is entitled to the same right of review as a person who has money." State ex rel.
Williams v. County of Hennepin, 252 Minn. 330, 333, 89 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1958)
(emphasis added).
149. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
150. "[W]e do not believe that the Equal Protection Clause, when interpreted in
the context of [prior] cases, requires [a state] to provide free counsel for indigent
defendants seeking to take discretionary appeals to the [state] Supreme Court, or to
file petitions for certiorari in this Court." Id. at 612.
151. "The fact that an appeal has been provided does not automatically mean that
a State then acts unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigent defendants at
every stage of the way." Id. at 611 (emphasis in original).
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sions when it said those decisions "stand for the proposition
that a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents
while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent per-
sons." 152 Thus, Ross cannot be said to support an argument
that a state may arbitrarily create classifications based on
wealth and force counsel upon an unwilling appellant on first
appeal. ' 5
3
Minnesota does have an appellate process.154 Therefore, di-
rect appeal must constitutionally be made available to the rich
and poor on an equal basis.155 Minnesota also has a statute
that prohibits the unauthorized practice of law.' 56 However,
this statute expressly excepts from its prohibition a party ap-
pearing on one's own behalf.157 In addition, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals expressly contemplates processing pro se ap-
peals in its internal rules.' 58 Even the Minnesota Supreme
152. Id. at 607.
153. One noted treatise writer, however, has viewed Ross as effectively sterilizing
the Douglas holding by severing Douglas from the newly created body of law, and
thereby "[clutting off Douglas' possibilities for future growth." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 16-51, at 1647 (2d ed. 1988). Whatever the case may be, the
present issue is not one of future growth of Douglas and its severance from Griffin and
Ross; rather, it is about equal treatment on a first appeal as of right. For that proposi-
tion, these cases still stand as the law of the land.
154. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for appeals from judg-
ments and appealable orders, and sets up procedures for protesting those appeals.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02.
155. See supra note .148.
156. The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person or association of persons, except mem-
bers of the bar of Minnesota admitted and licensed to practice as attorneys
at law, to appear as attorney or counselor at law in any action or proceeding
in any court in this state to maintain, conduct, or defend the same, except
personally as a party thereto in other than a representative capacity....
MINN. STAT. § 481.02, subd. 1 (1986). Moreover, in construing a predecessor statute,
the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that in addition to being guaranteed by the
statute, the right to represent oneself "undoubtedly exists independently of the stat-
ute." State v. Townley, 149 Minn. 5, 22, 182 N.W. 773, 781 (1921), cert. denied, 257
U.S. 643 (1921).
157. MINN. STAT. § 481.02, subd. 1 (1986).
158. "Members of the Minnesota Bar and specially admitted out-of-state attorneys
may argue before the Court. If a litigant is without counsel, the case shall be submit-
ted on briefs without oral arguments by any party, unless the Court orders other-
wise." MINN. CT. App. INTERNAL R. 2.9 (1987). Moreover, there are numerous cases,
both criminal and otherwise, where the Minnesota Court of Appeals has processed
cases when at least one party did not have counsel. See, e.g., State v. Ferraro, 403
N.W.2d 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (criminal case); see also Goddard v. Peterson, No.
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Court has processed and heard appeals from pro se litigants. 159
Thus the Minnesota legislature and courts have expressed an
intent to allow parties to appear in court on their own behalf.
It is clear that the State of Minnesota has not barred pro se
litigants from its appellate processes. Prior to Seifert, only indi-
gent criminal defendants were required to accept appellate
representation. Now, however, the United States and Minne-
sota Supreme Courts have expressly held that access to the
courts, including first appeal, cannot be denied to a class of
litigants on the basis of wealth without some compelling
interest.
It might be argued that such a classification is not discrimi-
natory insofar as the indigent criminal defendant would still
have access to the courts; that access is merely channeled
through an attorney. 60  However, this "channelling" effec-
tively operates as a denial of access to any indigent criminal
defendant who is unwilling to accept the required representa-
tion. Absent this "channelling," the defendant would ulti-
mately be refused appellate review.
It might also be claimed that requiring appellate counsel for
indigent criminal defendants discriminates in favor of, rather
than against, the indigent defendant.' 6' In either case, dis-
159. See State v. Peterson, 300 Minn. 516, 218 N.W.2d 704 (1974) (pro se appeal
from conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol); see also State v. Flynn, 313
N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1981) (pro se appeal of sentence imposed); Thomale v. State, 261
N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1977) (pro se petition for post conviction relief).
160. This claim does not negate the fact that some litigants would be able to
choose to proceed without counsel while others would either have counsel thrust
upon them or be required to forego appeal.
161. This argument was, in fact, made in Seifert. The Minnesota County Attorney's
Association, writing as amicus curiae, argued:
The forced participation of counsel on appeal does not violate the
Equal Protection clause of the Constitution. The state is not discriminating
against indigent appellants; it is discriminating for indigent appellants. Min-
nesota has chosen to require that indigent appellants accept the assistance
of counsel on appeal to insure that every indigent appellant has "meaning-
ful access" to the courts. That policy should not be disturbed. There can be
no prejudice to the appellant from such a situation.
County Brief, supra note 92, at 9 (emphasis in original).
This of course, misapprehends the issue. The issue is not whether counsel
prejudices the defendant's cause; rather, the issue is whether the proposal is discrimi-
natory. This very argument acknowledges the discrimination. It must be
remembered that equal protection no more protects favoritism than it does harmful
classifications. "[A]Il people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned,
'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.' " Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241
(1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
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crimination exists. Nevertheless, this assertion does not sur-
mount the basic constitutional problem that only poor litigants
are forced to accept counsel on appeal.
162
In the case of a fundamental right, when the state wishes to
discriminate on the basis of a classification, it must show a
compelling state interest that the classification is necessary to
promote the interest. 63 The dissent in Seifert was also con-
cerned that pro se appeals will reduce court efficiency. 164 It has
also been argued that allowing pro se appeals to indigent crimi-
nal defendants would ultimately increase cost to the state and
taxpayers.' 65 Fiscal responsibility and administrative conven-
ience have been rejected by the United States Supreme Court
as sufficient reasons to satisfy the strict scrutiny test.
166
The strongest reason for denying self-representation to indi-
than on account of religion, race or color." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17. Relying on Griffin,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that "a poor person is entitled to the same
right of [appellate] review as a person who has money." State v. County of Hennepin,
252 Minn. 330, 333, 89 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1958) (emphasis added).
162. The discrimination based on wealth still exists, even when it is coached in
terms of benefit rather than harm. The indisputable fact is that the indigent criminal
defendant is treated differently in the appellate courts for no other reason than that
the defendant is indigent. In Minnesota, all appellants are entitled to the "same"
right of review as a person with money. County of Hennepin, 252 Minn. at 333, 89
N.W.2d at 909. In any event, the benefit of this discrimination is a matter of percep-
tion. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
163. Griffin prohibits a State from discriminating against an indigent defendant in
criminal trials. The Supreme Court in Griffin implies that an indigent's right to coun-
sel is as fundamental a right as protection from discrimination based on religion, race
or color. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17. Justification of discrimination, therefore, must meet
the same "compelling interest" standard as cases involving the various suspect classi-
fications. This means that the government must present compelling reasons for the
discrimination and that no less restrictive alternatives exist. See generally Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971).
164. [W]hen an appellate judge reads an incomprehensible pro se brief, that
judge will be forced, out of conscience, to wear two hats-that ofjudge and
that of advocate-in order to assure the integrity of our reviewing function.
This will also be true of our law clerks doing research and preparing bench
memos, when issues and cases have not been adequately briefed. Do we
have the resources to do this and is it appropriate for us to do so?
Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 378 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
165. In Seifert, the SPDO argued, inter alia, that the costs of transcripts would have
to be dealt with if a defendant proceeded pro se. SPDO Brief, supra note 80, at 11.
The SPDO stated that appeals would have to be redone if it were determined that a
defendant was not competent to waive counsel. Id. It was also argued that overall
costs would increase in prosecuting appeals. See County Brief, supra note 92, at
14-16.
166. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973). Certainly, administra-
tive convenience has some importance. However, it will not be enough to justify a
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gent criminal defendants is the quality of advocacy by the pro se
litigant.167 There can be little doubt that a pro se appellant
hurts, rather than helps, the chances of success. 168 In addition
to the basic problem of unfamiliarity with the substantive law
applicable to any particular criminal case, certain serious prac-
tical problems arise. First, a pro se litigant will very likely lack
the knowledge and objectivity necessary to proceed effectively
in court. 169 Second, an incarcerated defendant will have lim-
ited or no access to legal materials. 70 Moreover, the pro se de-
classification under strict scrutiny because there are more important considerations
than convenience. The Frontiero Court stated:
In any case, our prior decisions make clear that, although efficacious admin-
istration of governmental programs is not without some importance, "the
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency .... And
when we enter the realm of "strict judicial scrutiny," there can be no doubt
that "administrative convenience" is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of
which dictates constitutionality.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has also stated that when considering laws that impact on
suspect classifications "a concern for fiscal integrity is no more compelling ajustifica-
tion for the questioned classification in these cases than it was in Shapiro." See Graham,
403 U.S. at 375; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (rejects fiscal
considerations as compelling interests when it results in invidious classification).
167. In her dissent to Seifert, Justice Wahl expressed great concern over the pro se
appellant's ability to raise and present issues in a comprehensible manner. Seifert,
423 N.W.2d at 378 (Wahl, J., dissenting). She argued that use of the SPDO in all
cases efficiently serves the ends of justice. Id. at 377. The dissenting justices in
Faretta raised similar concerns. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 838 (1975)
(Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. See Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 374. Seifert's court appointed counsel acknowl-
edged that the issue was not whether the appointed counsel would help the cause;
rather, "the question is whether due process will suffer a system of adjudication that
leaves Seifert no choice in the event that he believes the State Public Defender is
more 'state' than 'defender.' The heart of the Faretta right is not the truth of the
defendant's belief-it is the belief itself." See Petitioner Brief, supra note 80, at 20; see
also Bell v. Hopper, 511 F. Supp. 452, 453 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
169. Even though the defendant "obviously lacks the skill and knowledge neces-
sary to present a good defense," the defendant must be allowed to proceed pro se.
Bell, 511 F. Supp. at 453. "A defendant's '.. . technical legal knowledge, as such, [is]
not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right.... ."' Id.
170. In fact, rejection of counsel means that the defendant forfeits any right of
access to legal materials. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the United States
Supreme Court held that a state must provide prisoners with the means to vindicate
their rights after the first appeal in which the state must offer to provide counsel.
The state may accomplish this either by providing counsel for discretionary post con-
viction proceedings or by providing a law library or other legal materials with which
the defendant may use to proceed alone. Id. at 828.
The lower courts, including the Seifert court, have held that Bounds requires one
or the other at the state's choice. Therefore, if the state offers counsel and counsel is
rejected, the state need not offer legal materials. See United States ex rel. George v.
Lane, 718 F.2d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 1983); accord United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d
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fendant will have to overcome a lack of mobility in serving and
filing briefs and other papers.' 7 ' Third, the procedural re-
quirements for processing appeals can be difficult even for ex-
perienced attorneys, much less a lay person.' 72
In spite of these admittedly strong reasons for disallowing
self-representation to indigent criminal defendants, the same
difficulties exist for all pro se litigants.'7 3 Yet, the legislature
and the courts have a long-standing history of allowing self-
representation.' 74 Thus, if the difficulties presented when pro-
ceeding pro se are not sufficient to prohibit all pro se appeals,
they cannot be sufficient to prohibit only the appeals of indi-
gent criminal defendants. Absent some compelling reason for
such disparate treatment, this classification must fail. 175
Moreover, a compelling argument can be made that all com-
petent human beings, including indigent criminal appellants,
should have a basic right of self-determination.' 76 As stated in
1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 867 (1983), reh'g denied, 467 U.S.
1211 (1984); see also Kelsey v. State of Minnesota, 622 F.2d 956, 958 (8th Cir. 1980).
171. An incarcerated defendant will have great difficulty preparing the case and
making the required filings since the defendant will be unable to leave the correc-
tional facility. This difficulty, however, is no less real in the trial context. Seegenerally,
Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 86 YALE L.J. 292,
304-07 (1976). "Ajailed pro se defendant will almost certainly present an inadequate
defense because pretrial incarceration has prevented him from preparing any de-
fense." Id. at 293. Similar difficulties are present in the case of an incarcerated ap-
pellant, regardless of the appellant's indigency. Therefore, the restriction on
appellant's mobility cannot, by itself, justify disparate treatment.
172. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Minnesota Rules of
'Criminal Appellate Procedure, to which a criminal appellant will be bound, weave a
veritable tapestry of complicated procedures. Raising all appropriate issues, proper
calculation of deadlines, proper formatting of briefs and compliance with numerous
other requirements are often confusing for an attorney, let alone a pro se defendant.
To the uninitiated, the procedural requirements will be a morass. However, the Sei-
fert majority clearly indicated that the pro se defendant will receive no special treat-
ment and be held to the same standard as that of an attorney in presenting his
appeal. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 372.
173. Other defendants may not be incarcerated; however, those defendants will be
subject to the other problems encountered by the incarcerated defendant. In any
event, incarceration is not always a distinction applicable to criminal defendants since
not all indigent criminal appellants will be incarcerated pending appeal. Thus, any
rule prohibiting self-representation to indigents would, at the very least, be
overbroad.
174. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
175. Reliance on the old maxim that to represent oneself is to have a fool for a
client is surely not sufficient to justify the disparate treatment.
176. "The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the
accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the ac-
cused's best possible defense." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984),
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Faretta, it is the defendant who personally bears the conse-
quences of the criminal proceeding. 177 Basic notions of hu-
manity require acknowledgment that the defendant should be
allowed to decide how best to present a defense. 178 It is for the
competent defendant, and not the courts, to decide what is
best for him or her.
To force counsel on an unwilling appellant not only denies
recognition of freedom of choice, it reinforces the perception
that the law conspires to the defendant's detriment. 79 Thus,
the defendant should be free to determine when and if counsel
is advantageous. 180 While the Faretta holding is limited to the
trial stage, this rationale applies equally to all stages of a case,
including appeal. '8 '
reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984). Faretta also refers to the "inestimable worth of free
choice." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
177. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
178. The Court pointed out in Faretta:
Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend
is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the
personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who
must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to
his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to
his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of "that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law."
Id. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (Brennan, J., concurring), reh'g
denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970)).
179. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. The Faretta court implicitly acknowledged that the
defendant's subjective beliefs about counsel are appropriate considerations. "To
thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic
of the [Sixth] Amendment." Id. at 820. Forcing an attorney upon an unwilling de-
fendant in the appeal context is equally offensive. It is the defendant's perception
that is critical, not what others believe will present him or her with the best possible
defense.
180. In acknowledging this right of self-determination, the Court held that a de-
fendant may "'knowingly and intelligently' forego" the benefits of counsel. Id. at
835.
181. The courts allow defendants to make knowing and voluntary waivers in a
number of contexts. The best example is when a defendant pleads guilty to an of-
fense, the defendant waives a number of constitutional rights. However, as seen in
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), before accepting a guilty plea, the
court must first determine that the guilty plea is strictly voluntary, that the defendant
understands the nature of the charge against him and that he is aware of the conse-
quences of his plea. Id. at 464-67. In order to be assured that the waiver is knowing
and voluntary, the defendant must be questioned on the record concerning the vari-
ous rights that the defendant is waiving. The court cannot presume a valid waiver of
these rights from a silent record. So long as the defendant is competent, the courts
will not prohibit a defendant from waiving certain constitutional rights. Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
It should be noted that, in response to Seifert, the SPDO developed an exhaustive
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The right to determine one's fate in the judicial process on
appeal is no less personal, and the consequences no less real,
than at trial. To deny one class of defendants this choice,
based on the wealth of the defendant, is fundamentally unfair.
It is also constitutionally flawed.
Prohibiting self-representation by only indigent criminal de-
fendants impermissibly impairs access to the appellate stage
from an entire class of defendants on the basis of wealth. To
believe that Faretta alone would not bar the way for such a
change does not remove the equal protection issue.
Those defendants who can afford counsel have the option to
proceed without counsel, while those indigent criminal de-
fendants who cannot by definition afford an attorney, would be
deprived of the right to choose. Without some compelling
state reason, such a rule could not withstand attack. Thus,
amending the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure to sim-
ply negate Seifert would not only deprive indigent appellants
the basic human right of self-determination, it would also vio-
late equal protection. Under the present statute and rules
scheme, it is unlikely that any amendments short of prohibiting
self-representation in all appeals, would be constitutionally
permissible. Therefore, the right of an indigent criminal de-
fendant to proceed pro se on appeal is an "evil" that the courts
of Minnesota will have to learn to live with.
CONCLUSION
The defendant in Seifert won a significant victory for indigent
criminal defendants wishing to proceed pro se on direct appeal.
The victory was one for self-determination, dignity and free-
dom of choice in that it acknowledges that an appellan't, re-
gardless of wealth, has the ultimate control over how a case
should proceed. The Seifert decision not only correctly ana-
lyzed the state law, it was the only possible result under equal
protection. Moreover, contrary to the Seifert majority or dis-
sents, this result is not so easily changed.
In light of the practical problems accompanying this newly
waiver form that is to be used to assure that any defendant who wishes to proceed pro
se on appeal fully understands the implications of so choosing. See Order Directing
State Public Defender to Provide Preliminary Representation to Pro Se Appellants, File No. C7-
88-983 (May 9, 1988) (reprinted in Minn. Rep. 420-422 N.W.2d at LXIX) (waiver
form proposed by SPDO attached to order).
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established right, it was indeed a hollow victory at best. How-
ever, it is a right that competent defendants can, if they wish,
take advantage of. To paraphrase a passage from Faretta, de-
fendants not only have a right to make a fool of themselves at
trial, now they may also make fools of themselves on appeal. 182
182. Justice Blackmun argues that the decision to allow a defendant to proceed pro
se at trial "bestows a constitutional right on one to make a fool of himself." Faretta, 422
U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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